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Graph/crypto-misuse-unauthenticated-encryption-confusion

AntiPattern

Cryptography Misuse Confusion

crypto-misuse-unauthenticated-encryption-confusion

Cryptographic primitives are misapplied or conflated—e.g., unauthenticated AES-CBC with incorrect IV expectations, misunderstanding where keys/credentials live, or confusing private-key capabilities—so attackers can tamper or extract secrets despite “encryption” being present.

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Updated6/27/2026

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30 linked nodes

MATCHESSolution

SQS uses envelope encryption. Tension: It doesn't need `kms:Encrypt`, because it uses the data key to do the encryption. Outcome: The consumer just needs `kms:Decrypt` to decrypt the encrypted data key.

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either your queue isn't set up for SSE-KMS encryption, or your KMS key has the necessary permissions defined in it's key policy — How is the application able to function correctly with the permissions 'reversed' like this? Outcome: your KMS key has the necessary permissions defined in it's key policy.

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This type of encryption is free and transparent — Amazon S3 now applies server-side encryption with Amazon S3 managed keys (SSE-S3) as the base level of encryption for every bucket in Amazon S3. Tension: No. It is not allowed to disable encryption. Outcome: This type of encryption is free and transparent, so there's no compelling reason to turn it off anyway.

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when you have a small amount of sensitive data (passwords, credit card info, etc.) — encrypting a lot of data that you're constantly querying. Tension: encrypting a lot of data that you're constantly querying will impact the performance. Outcome: yes, TDE is the best choice because it works in a different way.

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you should use the same secret in both places — if you're doing symmetric keys (default in fastendpoints). Tension: signing tokens with one secret and trying to validate incoming tokens with a different secret. Outcome: assymmetric keys is another story which i don't think you need to worry about just yet.

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the API keys are stored in an encrypted form — more-annoying techniques (e.g., native code via the NDK). Tension: This too makes it more difficult for an attacker to get the keys. Outcome: but it does not prevent it completely.

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Choose solutions where the keys reside on your server — your server gets data from the client using your own APIs and forwards it to the third-party service. Tension: To prevent an attacker from getting client-side API keys.

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to search for the encrypted data. Tension: not ideal for security. Outcome: then you can use an index to search for the encrypted data.

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Encrypting the plain text locally and storing the ciphertext remotely is the way to go. — You want to have protection from the remote attackers? Tension: Encryption has never solved any problems for us. It has just shifted the problems somewhere else. Outcome: protection from remote attackers is doable.

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No change is required for normal HTTPS behavior; DevTools displaying plaintext is expected and safe as TLS encryption protects data in transit. Ensure the site uses HTTPS to keep network traffic encrypted.

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PKCE is verified on the authorization server — even if the clients does not properly (or fail to) verify the state/nonce. Tension: PKCE will still protect them. Outcome: PKCE will still protect them.

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I would simply hold the secrets in memory — Based on the logic here. Tension: reading secrets every time disrupts availability. Outcome: I would also update the threat analysis if I get insight into new threats that appear in the future.

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Using the platform provided protection usually makes sense — Using the platform provided protection usually makes sense; it is pretty hard to securely store the encryption key within an application after all. Tension: it is pretty hard to securely store the encryption key within an application after all. Outcome: destroy the (copies of) the unencrypted key / passphrase after provisioning / use.

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pass `False` if you're not using the algorithm for security purposes. — False indicates that the hashing algorithm is not used in a security context. Tension: Insecure algorithms are enabled by default. Outcome: Python will tell OpenSSL to allow insecure algorithms anyway.

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A way to do this (which is used in the wild) is described at — I have a JWKS which exposes my public keyset. Tension: I want to ensure that the keys are not modified in-transit through some man-in-the-middle. Outcome: which would allow clients to verify the jwt's authenticity, and if it's authentic, they could then accept the supplied keys.

MATCHESSolution

PKCE protects against a specific vulnerability. — if something can intercept the redirect. Tension: the `code` alone is useless because they need the `code_verifier`. Outcome: they need the `code_verifier` which lives in the app that originally initiated the `authorization_code` flow.

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Your hardware token idea is the only thing you've listed that is plausible — assuming the token's hardware has its own clock and is hardened against tampering. Tension: There is no way to trust hardware that someone else controls. Outcome: This is just a computer that you trust because the user does not control it.

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A solution I've found is to use the `hash_secret_raw` function: — use the `hash_secret_raw` function. Outcome: b64_key = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(key) cipher = Fernet(b64_key).

MATCHESSolution

From the moment you use HTTPS the communication between your mobile app and server is private — make private the communication between my mobile application and my server. Tension: someone can intercepts http calls and copy the static token. Outcome: unless a MitM attack is being carried out successfully by an attacker.

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If you want to keep a key secret safe — wallet secrets. Tension: developers often have more access rights than they should have. Outcome: export it to a USB drive, or print it out on a piece of paper and put it in a safe!

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using the `crypto` module is fine — In Node.js. Tension: instead of trying to do it yourself. Outcome: you can simply do what you're doing without concern.

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protecting the individual endpoints properly. Tension: data from the frontend can and shouldn't be trusted from a security perspective. Outcome: you're already taking the proper countermeasures.

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Conforming readers shall respect the intent of the document creator — according to the permissions contained in the file. Tension: There is nothing inherent in PDF encryption that enforces the document permissions specified in the encryption dictionary. Outcome: restricting user access to an encrypted PDF file according to the permissions contained in the file.

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Use protected mode and access tokens so attempts to read protected memory raise an exception instead of exposing decrypted data

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If you want to have e.g. functionality such as signed (and/or encrypted) email then you'd use a higher level protocol such as PKCS#7 — If you want to have e.g. functionality such as signed (and/or encrypted) email. Tension: CMS supports both encryption (enveloped data) and signatures. Outcome: you can simply base64 encode it.

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The only way I can think of is "frontend security" — pdf viewer apps won't let you do that. Tension: from a technical standpoint if the decrypted data is in my RAM it seems impossible to stop me. Outcome: no actual security.

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Browsers themselves provide an encryption interface. That interface supports AES-GCM — You mention using the private key. Tension: WebAuthn does not currently provide any symmetric key that can be used for encryption. Outcome: You would need to download Chr.

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The main logic is, that CyberArk PAM (privileged access management) will work as proxy for the WinSCP which will route (and spy) whole traffic. — The setting is easy and contains only two steps in dialog for connection on WinSCP side. Tension: I tested SFTP instead of SCP and it did not work in my environment.

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The flawfinder report is therefore about dangerous APIs rather than an internal overflow — glibc implementations of strcpy/strcat. Tension: bounds checks cannot be added without changing the API.

MATCHESSolution

Replicate the Java key-derivation step in C# (same KDF type, salt/password handling, iteration count, and derived key length) before initializing AES/GCM with the derived key. After matching the derivation and parameters, decrypt successfully.

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