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Graph/crypto-primitive-misuse-missing-properties

AntiPattern

Crypto Misuse and Tradeoffs

crypto-primitive-misuse-missing-properties

Encryption and hashing fail because primitives are used without required properties—no authentication for AES-CBC, static salt for passwords, and non-deterministic ciphertext that breaks indexing—so confidentiality, integrity, and usability guarantees collapse.

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Updated7/26/2026

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MATCHESSolution

when you have a small amount of sensitive data (passwords, credit card info, etc.) — encrypting a lot of data that you're constantly querying. Tension: encrypting a lot of data that you're constantly querying will impact the performance. Outcome: yes, TDE is the best choice because it works in a different way.

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the API keys are stored in an encrypted form — more-annoying techniques (e.g., native code via the NDK). Tension: This too makes it more difficult for an attacker to get the keys. Outcome: but it does not prevent it completely.

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You could try to implement some obfuscation techniques that make it harder to bypass — for client-side (offline) extensions. Tension: you can't make it impossible to bypass. Outcome: Your time is better spent developing new extension features that attract more paying users.

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Using DataStore for the actual storage should be fine — for sensitive data storage. Tension: DataStore does not offer encryption. Outcome: you can encrypt/decrypt your data yourself.

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to search for the encrypted data. Tension: not ideal for security. Outcome: then you can use an index to search for the encrypted data.

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Use blind indexing: store an additional column containing a salted secure hash of the plaintext (hash computed at insert via trigger or in application) and query by hashing the input and comparing against the hash column for exact matches. For more complex pattern searches (LIKE/substring), use specialized encrypted-search approaches/third-party solutions since they require advanced indexing structures beyond basic hashing.

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Take the inputted password, throw it in a loop that adds adds an extra character at the end, beginning, wherever, and then match it against the stored hash. — You would need to kind of brute force it, I think. Tension: how do systems enforce the not being similar test without having to store the passwords in plain text in the database?

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you should use the J9 JVM — If you are really that paranoid that this may not happen. Tension: it will not dump the values to a regular heap dump. Outcome: hash the passwords immediately after getting them and do all the further steps only with the hashes.

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Stored using a one-way function, Argon2id with the recommended parameters is fine. Tension: If hashing is recommended, what algorithms are best suited for this purpose? Outcome: Argon2id with the recommended parameters is fine, but bcrypt and salted SHA2-256 are popular choices.

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Encrypting the plain text locally and storing the ciphertext remotely is the way to go. — You want to have protection from the remote attackers? Tension: Encryption has never solved any problems for us. It has just shifted the problems somewhere else. Outcome: protection from remote attackers is doable.

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Use Hash-Based Message Authentication Code or any cryptographic library or built-in .NET classes

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This is intended to provide protection against a denial-of-service caused by carefully chosen inputs — `__hash__()` values of str and bytes objects are “salted” with an unpredictable random value. Tension: carefully chosen inputs that exploit the worst case performance of a dict insertion, `O(n2)` complexity. Outcome: security benefits of the change won out over the performance impact for strings and `bytes` objects.

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I would simply hold the secrets in memory — Based on the logic here. Tension: reading secrets every time disrupts availability. Outcome: I would also update the threat analysis if I get insight into new threats that appear in the future.

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Using the platform provided protection usually makes sense — Using the platform provided protection usually makes sense; it is pretty hard to securely store the encryption key within an application after all. Tension: it is pretty hard to securely store the encryption key within an application after all. Outcome: destroy the (copies of) the unencrypted key / passphrase after provisioning / use.

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pass `False` if you're not using the algorithm for security purposes. — False indicates that the hashing algorithm is not used in a security context. Tension: Insecure algorithms are enabled by default. Outcome: Python will tell OpenSSL to allow insecure algorithms anyway.

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Your hardware token idea is the only thing you've listed that is plausible — assuming the token's hardware has its own clock and is hardened against tampering. Tension: There is no way to trust hardware that someone else controls. Outcome: This is just a computer that you trust because the user does not control it.

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If you want to keep a key secret safe — wallet secrets. Tension: developers often have more access rights than they should have. Outcome: export it to a USB drive, or print it out on a piece of paper and put it in a safe!

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Use a password-hashing algorithm designed for authentication (e.g., bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2) and generate a unique random salt per password, storing the salt (or the full hash parameters) with the user record. Optionally add a secret pepper stored outside the codebase/DB, and verify passwords using the library’s verification function.

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using the `crypto` module is fine — In Node.js. Tension: instead of trying to do it yourself. Outcome: you can simply do what you're doing without concern.

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protecting the individual endpoints properly. Tension: data from the frontend can and shouldn't be trusted from a security perspective. Outcome: you're already taking the proper countermeasures.

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Conforming readers shall respect the intent of the document creator — according to the permissions contained in the file. Tension: There is nothing inherent in PDF encryption that enforces the document permissions specified in the encryption dictionary. Outcome: restricting user access to an encrypted PDF file according to the permissions contained in the file.

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Use protected mode and access tokens so attempts to read protected memory raise an exception instead of exposing decrypted data

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If you want to have e.g. functionality such as signed (and/or encrypted) email then you'd use a higher level protocol such as PKCS#7 — If you want to have e.g. functionality such as signed (and/or encrypted) email. Tension: CMS supports both encryption (enveloped data) and signatures. Outcome: you can simply base64 encode it.

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The only way I can think of is "frontend security" — pdf viewer apps won't let you do that. Tension: from a technical standpoint if the decrypted data is in my RAM it seems impossible to stop me. Outcome: no actual security.

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Encrypting the refresh token is a good idea — without the need for a database. Tension: If you know that this will not happen to your users. Outcome: that approach might be ok.

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Browsers themselves provide an encryption interface. That interface supports AES-GCM — You mention using the private key. Tension: WebAuthn does not currently provide any symmetric key that can be used for encryption. Outcome: You would need to download Chr.

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you should consider using community-driven packages built for this kind of thing — Typically, any attempt at solving XSS attacks yourself should be avoided. Tension: they will find these pseudo-protocol calls. Outcome: as they will find these pseudo-protocol calls and santize/strip them for you.

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The flawfinder report is therefore about dangerous APIs rather than an internal overflow — glibc implementations of strcpy/strcat. Tension: bounds checks cannot be added without changing the API.

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Replicate the Java key-derivation step in C# (same KDF type, salt/password handling, iteration count, and derived key length) before initializing AES/GCM with the derived key. After matching the derivation and parameters, decrypt successfully.

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Had to design system from first principles — with security constraints. Outcome: design system from first principles with security constraints.

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