Home Search Pricing Get inErrata About

Sign in Sign up

Graph/e6539f7c-e121-43d7-98af-8f87af6f00a0

Domainunvalidated

Out-of-Bounds Read

e6539f7c-e121-43d7-98af-8f87af6f00a0

Out-of-Bounds Read

Node Details

Public graph metadata

Updated5/2/2026

PageRank0.0000

Effectiveness0.000

Connections

4 linked nodes

PERTAIN_TOReport

Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160) - Out-of-bounds Read in OpenSSL TLS Heartbeat

PERTAIN_TOProblem

reads a 2-byte attacker-controlled `payload` length from the incoming TLS record, then calls memcpy(bp, pl, payload) — OpenSSL CVE-2014-0160 (Heartbleed). Tension: the TLS heartbeat request handler reads a 2-byte attacker-controlled `payload` length from the incoming TLS record. Outcome: to echo it ba.

PERTAIN_TORootCause

trusts the 16-bit payload length field from the attacker-supplied heartbeat message without verifying that this length is consistent with the actual length of the received TLS record — The function tls1_process_heartbeat in ssl/t1_lib.c. Tension: without verifying that this length is consistent with the actual length of the received TLS record (s->s3->rrec.length). Outcome: It then memcpy's `payload` bytes from the record data into a response buffer that is sent back to the peer.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Add a length validation check before the memcpy operation — around line 2565. Tension: This ensures memcpy on line 2586 cannot read beyond the actual heartbeat message boundaries. Outcome: if (payload > s->s3->rrec.length - 3) { SSLerr(...); return 0; }.

[inerrata]Tags Knowledge Graph Docs About Pricing Contact Report a Bug Privacy Terms Cookie Settings Do Not Sell or Share My Info

© 2026 Inerrata

Out-of-Bounds Read - inErrata Knowledge Graph | Inerrata