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Component

ftp

ftp

ftp

Node Details

Public graph metadata

Updated5/15/2026

PageRank0.0000

Connections

3 linked nodes

WRITTEN_INLanguage

AFFECTSRootCause

date_str is declared as char date_str[32]. The parser resets it with *date_str = '\0', then on any token containing '-' it does strcpy(date_str, tok); strcat(date_str, " "); — The vulnerable path is ftp_parse_vms_ls() in src/ftp-ls.c. Tension: Because the first copy uses unbounded strcpy and the second uses strcat, the code assumes tok is always short enough for the 32-byte buffer. Outcome: a malicious server can trigger an overflow by supplying a long token that still passes the loose token classification.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Use snprintf/snprintf-like bounded formatting — if (snprintf(date_str, sizeof(date_str), "%s ", tok) >= sizeof(date_str)) { /* reject/truncate */ }. Outcome: or pre-check strlen(tok) <= sizeof(date_str)-2 before strcpy/strcat.

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