Home Search Pricing Get inErrata About

Sign in Sign up

Graph/missing-authenticated-encryption

Pattern

Missing Authenticated Encryption

missing-authenticated-encryption

Encryption is implemented without integrity/authentication (e.g., default AES-CBC + PKCS#7 or encrypting the wrong boundary), so ciphertext can be altered or misused undetected; at the same time key handling/placement may keep secrets alive longer than intended.

Node Details

Public graph metadata

Updated7/7/2026

Connections

30 linked nodes

you've got duplicate permissions defined in different places — Assuming the queue is encrypted. Tension: which isn't ideal, and you've got permissions defined that you don't need. Outcome: neither producer nor consumer need `kms:Encrypt`.

Is there a way to not make a S3 bucket encrypted by default or may be remove the added encryption? — Amazon S3 now applies server-side encryption with Amazon S3 managed keys (SSE-S3) as the base level of encryption for every bucket in Amazon S3. Tension: AWS recently changed their policy. Outcome: No. It is not allowed to disable encryption.

encrypting a lot of data that you're constantly querying will impact the performance — when you have a small amount of sensitive data (passwords, credit card info, etc.). Tension: encrypting a lot of data that you're constantly querying will impact the performance. Outcome: yes, TDE is the best choice because it works in a different way.

OpenSSL does not seem to support prompting for the password when accessing a TPM handle — when the key is created with password protection (userAuth in TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE). Tension: it fails silently or with cryptic errors. Outcome: If I leave the password empty (no userAuth), I can successfully generate a self-signed certificate.

DataStore does not offer encryption — I'm using Jetpack DataStore in my Android application and want to ensure it's secure enough for storing sensitive data. Tension: could it potentially be decrypted by an attacker? Outcome: Using DataStore for the actual storage should be fine, and you can encrypt/decrypt your data yourself.

When sensitive fields are encrypted in PostgreSQL, queries using WHERE (e.g., exact match) cannot efficiently filter rows because the encrypted values cannot be compared without decrypting them. This makes encrypted-field searches slow and impractical at scale.

The clientside storage of this key should be as secure as possible and never be sent to the server — ts encrypted data and decrypts it locally. Tension: otherwise I as the owner (or an attacker in the system) could decrypt the users database entries. Outcome: Encrypting the plain text locally and storing the ciphertext remotely is the way to go.

I don't want to hardcode it. — How to make secure info of my sign app when I want to release my app. Tension: I would like to keep them safe from attacker and reverse engineering. Outcome: externalizing secrets.

When an OAuth 2.0 provider allows both authorization code with client credentials (confidential client) and authorization code with PKCE without a client secret (public client), it’s unclear whether client credentials provide any benefit over PKCE for regular web applications.

many client library implemntations fails to properly verify the nonce/state. Tension: leaving the clients vulnerable. Outcome: PKCE will still protect them.

authorization code injection attacks against confidential clients

there is no plain-text key and password available on the Kiosk machine. Tension: Would you say this would be a good workflow to make sure. Outcome: the app checks whether there is an unencrypted key and pass and if yes, then it encrypts them.

Confusion about cookie authentication versus token authentication

I want to ensure that the keys are not modified in-transit through some man-in-the-middle. — I have a JWKS which exposes my public keyset. Tension: I don't see any support for this. Outcome: validate the signature, thus validate the public keys in my JWKS.

I have tried my code but it doesn't enable transparent data encryption on my SQL server. — I'm trying to setup transparent data encryption on my Azure SQL server with the help of a customer managed key I have stored on my key vault. Tension: doing all of this via Azure SDK for python. Outcome: Transparent Data Encryption with CMK was enabled in Azure SQL from Key vault successfully.

The API hashes passwords using SHA-256 with a fixed "salt", but it is unclear whether this approach is secure enough for user authentication. The current implementation uses the same value for every password, reducing the intended protection.

In the event that an attacker can dump the entire RAM (e.g. through DMA) — DPAPI on Windows provides functions to encrypt and decrypt arbitrary data. Tension: will DPAPI use it to protect its encryption key instead? If so, for which of the functions previously listed is this true?

MongoDB client-side field level encryption generates a new Data Encryption Key on each run, making previously encrypted data unreadable

the secret string `abc123` leaks up in three places: — If I run this,. Tension: I can replace the hardcoded password with something like `$(pass show cloudflare-api-key)`, in which case the password only leak s in `ps` output. Outcome: This is still bad, as an unprivileged daemon on my machine could steal my credentials.

isn't HTTP Signature enough by itself to prove identity? — secure an API and looking into ways to secure it. Outcome: why use it in combination with something else (like API key or OAuth)?

Once the document has been opened and decrypted successfully — a conforming reader. Tension: There is nothing inherent in PDF encryption that enforces the document permissions specified in the encryption dictionary. Outcome: a conforming reader technically has access to the entire contents of the document.

admin password security mechanism in PDFs

you can sniff all HTTPS communications in an unencrypted form. Tension: All fields and data from headers, request bodies, and responses are intercepted without encryption. Outcome: Traffic is encrypted to protect the user, not to protect apps from their user.

That however is not a safe way to encrypt data by itself. Tension: because it doesn't include any authentication. Outcome: I would recommend either finding a high-level library that builds on top of WebCrypto.

The user asks why CSRF tokens are reportedly encrypted and whether encryption is necessary or useful, since an attacker who steals a token could reuse it to pass validation.

AES/GCM-encrypted text produced in Java using Bouncy Castle could not be decrypted in C# using Bouncy Castle. Decryption fails because the C# side does not match the exact encryption key/IV/tag derivation used by the Java encryptor.

Invalid signature: Document is modified. — When trying to insert the certificate from the ESP response. Tension: signature become invalid when checked in adobe. Outcome: the hash of the signed document bytes is incorrect here.

A heap buffer overflow in OpenSSL's SM2 decryption (CVE-2021-3711). — OpenSSL's SM2 decryption. Outcome: There is also no bounds check in sm2_decrypt before writing C2->length bytes into ptext_buf.

a timing side-channel vulnerability exists in _gnutls_srtp_recv_params() — When parsing DTLS ClientHello SRTP extension profiles. Tension: the server uses a non-constant-time nested loop. Outcome: An attacker sends DTLS ClientHellos with varying SRTP profile orderings, measures response timing, and reconstructs the server's profile preference order.

resulting in a write to freed heap memory via memset() — during the TLS handshake. Tension: If key derivation fails during client key exchange processing, the ephemeral parameters are freed by calc_ecdh_key() but then accessed again by the caller's cleanup code. Outcome: The vulnerability is fixed by eliminating the double-cleanup anti-pattern.

[inerrata]Tags Knowledge Graph Docs About Team Pricing Contact Report a Bug Privacy Terms Cookie Settings Do Not Sell or Share My Info

© 2026 Inerrata