Home Search Pricing Get inErrata About

Sign in Sign up

Graph/miswired-crypto-auth-boundaries

AntiPattern

Miswired Crypto/Auth Boundaries

miswired-crypto-auth-boundaries

Validation, encryption, and key management responsibilities get mixed up—JWT secrets used by the signer also “validate,” AES lacks integrity/authentication, and secrets aren’t safely scoped—so tokens and ciphertext may be accepted or decrypted incorrectly.

Node Details

Public graph metadata

Updated7/2/2026

Connections

30 linked nodes

MATCHESSolution

This environment variable wasn't set in my deployment. Tension: the code to decrypt the token back out of the session cookie was silently failing. Outcome: The token returned by Firebase was getting encrypted by svelte using a private key controlled by an environment variable named `VITE_JWT_KEY`.

MATCHESSolution

Fetch the public key certificate from Keycloak to verify the JWT token signature. — certs_url = f"{self.keycloak_url}/realms/{self.realm}/protocol/openid-connect/certs". Tension: Decode and verify the JWT token signature using the public key, while skipping audience and issuer checks. Outcome: jwt.decode( token, public_key, algorithms=['RS256'], options={ 'verify_aud': False, 'verify_iss': False } ).

MATCHESSolution

either your queue isn't set up for SSE-KMS encryption, or your KMS key has the necessary permissions defined in it's key policy — How is the application able to function correctly with the permissions 'reversed' like this? Outcome: your KMS key has the necessary permissions defined in it's key policy.

MATCHESSolution

you should use the same secret in both places — if you're doing symmetric keys (default in fastendpoints). Tension: signing tokens with one secret and trying to validate incoming tokens with a different secret. Outcome: assymmetric keys is another story which i don't think you need to worry about just yet.

MATCHESSolution

the information about the user is inside the JWT — other services does not need to call the authorization service or database. Tension: this token is signed from the authorization service but other services does not need to call the authorization service or database. Outcome: they only need a shared secret they use to check the validity of the token.

MATCHESSolution

it does not fulfilll the requirements for being mode 1 level 4 — Secure Connections Only Mode. Tension: JustWorks Unauthenticated will be used. Outcome: the state of being can not be called "Secure Connections Only Mode".

MATCHESSolution

Implement server-side validation to ensure that the received token is valid and not compromised

MATCHESSolution

you can setup basic CORS policies — If you have control over the endpoint providing jwt token. Tension: so that only your app will be whitlested and accessible to the endpoints. Outcome: Here is the sample example for CORS settings.

MATCHESSolution

Perform the authorization-code-to-token exchange in the backend to keep tokens and the client secret off the client. Create/establish an app-specific user session (e.g., HTTP session cookies or tokens) and do not use the external provider access token directly for your backend authorization; generate/validate authorization specific to your APIs.

MATCHESSolution

You NEVER expose your JWT_SECRET to the client — You generate a 32-byte (minimum) secure string that only the server knows. Tension: If they tried to encode a JWT using a different key, then it would fail jwtVerify. Outcome: a user cannot forge a token because they don't know the key.

MATCHESSolution

PKCE is verified on the authorization server — even if the clients does not properly (or fail to) verify the state/nonce. Tension: PKCE will still protect them. Outcome: PKCE will still protect them.

MATCHESSolution

Use server-side token generation and cryptographically sign the double-submit token to bind it to the session cookie

MATCHESSolution

First thing's first: HTTPS. — if JWT is a POST parameter or a bearer token under HTTPS. Tension: if an attacker even manages to steal it, it will no longer be useful. Outcome: you could make it a one-timed token.

MATCHESSolution

A way to do this (which is used in the wild) is described at — I have a JWKS which exposes my public keyset. Tension: I want to ensure that the keys are not modified in-transit through some man-in-the-middle. Outcome: which would allow clients to verify the jwt's authenticity, and if it's authentic, they could then accept the supplied keys.

MATCHESSolution

by supplying the certificate chain as is described in the JWKS spec. Tension: I could use JWS (if I don't mind the keys not being directly human-readable) or something like JSF. Outcome: by supplying the certificate chain as is described in the JWKS spec.

MATCHESSolution

I could store the JWT in a httpOnly cookie — The server wouldn't accept requests without the `Authorization` header. Tension: the solution would be having a middleware on the server placed before the authentication one. Outcome: read the token from the cookie, set the `Authorization` header and finally pass the request to the next handler.

MATCHESSolution

Safe storage is either http only cookie storage or Session Storage — store JWTs on the client. Tension: Lokal Storage could not be used for the exact same reason you mention, XXS attacks. Outcome: I personally prefer the prior if possible, but both are considered to be valid choises.

MATCHESSolution

The most correct OAuth way to design this is to use scopes and claims. — access tokens and the user identity to flow between microservices. Tension: without security concerns. Outcome: The APIs also check for required scopes.

MATCHESSolution

Use opaque, signed, time-limited tokens instead of plain email in links, and revalidate any client-provided value on the server

MATCHESSolution

the JWT token should be evaluated in the resource server — whatever system that relies on a JWT token validates it properly. Tension: the signature and relevant claims like the `aud` claim etc. Outcome: the JWT token should be evaluated in the resource server.

MATCHESSolution

JWT implementations hash the header.payload bytes with SHA-256 to produce a fixed-length digest, then sign that digest; this keeps signatures smaller and makes signing/verifying efficient while preserving integrity.

MATCHESSolution

Your hardware token idea is the only thing you've listed that is plausible — assuming the token's hardware has its own clock and is hardened against tampering. Tension: There is no way to trust hardware that someone else controls. Outcome: This is just a computer that you trust because the user does not control it.

MATCHESSolution

From the moment you use HTTPS the communication between your mobile app and server is private — make private the communication between my mobile application and my server. Tension: someone can intercepts http calls and copy the static token. Outcome: unless a MitM attack is being carried out successfully by an attacker.

MATCHESSolution

If you want to keep a key secret safe — wallet secrets. Tension: developers often have more access rights than they should have. Outcome: export it to a USB drive, or print it out on a piece of paper and put it in a safe!

MATCHESSolution

One good approach is to deploy in front of your GCF a Cloud Endpoints. — https://cloud.google.com/endpoints/docs/openapi/set-up-cloud-functions-espv2. Tension: With this approach you don't need to implement the logic to validate the JWT. Outcome: Use the security definition in the YAML to validate the JWT.

MATCHESSolution

protecting the individual endpoints properly. Tension: data from the frontend can and shouldn't be trusted from a security perspective. Outcome: you're already taking the proper countermeasures.

MATCHESSolution

Use protected mode and access tokens so attempts to read protected memory raise an exception instead of exposing decrypted data

MATCHESSolution

I guess I'm looking for a kind a JWT associated to the ID without expiration but maybe there is better solution. — Generate unpredictable/unforgeable URL from predictable ID. Outcome: I think your idea of using a JWT makes the most sense.

MATCHESSolution

Solution: — leveraging Spring Security for Authentication. Tension: The process to decrypt the token and add it to the request is pretty nasty. Outcome: I worked around the issue and got it working.

MATCHESSolution

I'm verifying the user OTP to change password — after change password. Tension: unable to create access and refresh token using JWT.

[inerrata]Tags Knowledge Graph Docs About Team Pricing Contact Report a Bug Privacy Terms Cookie Settings Do Not Sell or Share My Info

© 2026 Inerrata

Miswired Crypto/Auth Boundaries - inErrata Knowledge Graph | Inerrata