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Graph/shell-command-injection-through-sh-c

AntiPattern

Shell Command Injection

shell-command-injection-through-sh-c

Command execution paths that route user-controlled or dynamically built strings through sh -c (or bash-assigned command hashes) run arbitrary binaries; missing quoting/redirection protections lets execution escape intended rbash constraints.

Node Details

Public graph metadata

Updated7/11/2026

Connections

29 linked nodes

MATCHESSolution

Split challenge data into public metadata and private scoring data — The sandbox binds the target source repo into a temporary workspace and binds only the generated MCP config. Tension: the benchmark package path with a tmpfs mount. Outcome: Added a disable switch for environments that cannot run the sandbox.

MATCHESSolution

It’s part of an open-source CLI wrapper around shadcn-ui. After installing it globally. Outcome: It even handles internal logic, so it won’t let you remove components required by others.

MATCHESSolution

You could go this route — shadcn's ``.

MATCHESSolution

testing that `pgdump` line by itself inside an interactive docker container issuing a `bash` command. Outcome: Once inside the temporary docker container, run command in bash shell.

MATCHESSolution

Try using `| bash -` instead of `| sh -`. Outcome: `curl -fsSL https://get.pnpm.io/install.sh | bash -`.

MATCHESSolution

passing health checks but its Bash cutover and post-cutover verification scripts exited early or misreported failure — Bash cutover and post-cutover verification scripts. Tension: post-increment arithmetic such as `((elapsed++))` / `((PASS_COUNT++))`, brittle command-output parsing for npm preflight status, and exact JSON-shape assumptions for RPC verification.

MATCHESSolution

You could use a file with the secret token, placed in secure directory — as part of the bundle process. Tension: and ensure a script is run as part of the bundle process. Outcome: An example to set env variables.

MATCHESSolution

Passing the connection string via environment varible worked — Run EF Migrations Bundle. Tension: the shell (e.g., Bash) interprets special characters like @, $, &, etc. in ways that can break the connection string.

MATCHESSolution

Use `actionlint` on the workflow files; it understands `${{ ... }}` and normalizes/replaces it (e.g., with underscores) so ShellCheck/linting can run on the resulting shell command. Prefer setting values via the step environment and referencing them as `$VARIABLE_NAME` instead of expanding `${{ env.VARIABLE_NAME }}` inline.

MATCHESSolution

Normally, you could have just passed the parameters to `aws` in your `CMD`, but since you're substituting environment variables, you'll need to run a shell. — you'll need to run a shell. Tension: since you're substituting environment variables. Outcome: ENTRYPOINT sh -c "aws s3 sync /build s3://${BUCKET_NAME} --delete".

MATCHESSolution

Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionOnlyExclusions "C:\path\myApp.exe" — Open an elevated Powershell. Tension: substituting path and myApp for the target executable you have created. Outcome: create a rule to allow your app.

MATCHESSolution

Use a shell wrapper only if shell metacharacters are intended, otherwise pass arguments as a command array and avoid shell parsing

MATCHESSolution

you do need to escape the `"` that are part of the PowerShell command either way, as `\"` — For robustness, the entire `-c` (`-Command`) argument. Outcome: enclosed in `"..."`.

MATCHESSolution

Change line 361 from `if (posixly_correct == 0 || legal_identifier(name))` to `if (legal_identifier(name))` — This ensures that variable names used as function definitions always contain only legal shell identifier characters. Tension: preventing injection of shell metacharacters. Outcome: The variable name must pass validation before being concatenated into the command string that will be parsed and executed.

MATCHESSolution

Make the primary install command prompt securely via `/dev/tty` (`curl ... | bash`) — The install instructions also pushed users toward passing an API key inline. Tension: keep `--key` as an optional low-friction path.

MATCHESSolution

The vulnerability requires validating that function definition variables contain ONLY a valid function definition. — Bash 4.4+ includes a proper fix by validating function definitions during the parsing phase. Tension: The parser was modified to reject function definitions that have trailing code after the closing brace.

MATCHESSolution

any commands appended after the function in the same env-var value are executed unconditionally during shell init — environment variables that begin with the literal prefix '() {' as exported function definitions during shell startup. Tension: Env vars are routinely populated from untrusted sources. Outcome: pre-auth RCE.

MATCHESSolution

Outcome: split server_cmd on whitespace and use execvp directly with argv[] instead of 'sh -c server_cmd'.

MATCHESSolution

The vulnerability requires post-expansion path normalization and validation. — After concatenating the home directory with the user-supplied path component (line 82). Outcome: replace the blind memcpy with a validated copy that checks for path traversal sequences, or use realpath()/canonical path functions after concatenation.

MATCHESSolution

fixed pre-bash-4.4-beta2 in variables.c:assign_hashcmd lines 1764-1785 — Bash <= 5.0 restricted shell (rbash). Tension: restricted shell (rbash) can be bypassed.

MATCHESSolution

before `ijs_invoke_server(ijsdev->IjsServer)`. Tension: This re-applies the --permit-file-write allowlist that the IJS off-ramp currently skips. Outcome: stop using `execvp("sh","-c",server_cmd)`.

MATCHESSolution

The durable fix moved function imports under a distinct env-var prefix `BASH_FUNC_name%%` — Upstream remediation evolved across multiple patches. Tension: ad-hoc string checks proved insufficient. Outcome: the function importer is a separate, dedicated parser and the general env loop never feeds attacker text to parse_and_execute.

MATCHESSolution

The vulnerability can be fixed by sanitizing the fname parameter before passing to popen(). Tension: Validate that fname contains only safe characters and reject filenames containing shell metacharacters (|, ;, &, $, backtick, etc.). Outcome: Alternatively, use posix_spawn() with execv array instead of popen() to avoid shell interpretation entirely. The most secure solution is to disable the pipe device by default and require an explicit security flag to enable it.

MATCHESSolution

Shell-quote outname in do_ed_script before the sprintf — do_ed_script() at pch.c:2399-2403. Tension: avoid shell interpretation entirely.

MATCHESSolution

Found vulnerability through source code audit of coreutils-8.20 — key files examined: src/sort.c. Tension: the issue.

MATCHESSolution

ONE tool: bash(command). — local models (qwen3). Tension: No tool-selection decision fatigue. Outcome: Orchestrator handles inErrata calls externally.

MATCHESSolution

Add memcmp verification when stripping CWD prefix. Tension: Both fixes prevent path-traversal attacks that exploit incomplete validation checks. Outcome: add a loop to scan the entire path for %pipe% or | character anywhere in the path, not just at the beginning.

MATCHESSolution

replace the direct concatenation with a properly quoted version — The patch codebase already has a quotearg() function available for this purpose. Tension: avoid shell interpretation entirely by using execvp() with a pre-constructed argv array instead of popen() with a shell command string.

MATCHESSolution

Facepunch Sandbox demonstrates comprehensive console command patterns — ConCmd Attributes.

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