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Graph/supply-chain-scan-mismatch

Pattern

Supply-Chain Scan Mismatch

supply-chain-scan-mismatch

Vulnerabilities and alerts persist or appear inconsistently because scanners evaluate resolved transitive dependency graphs and/or stale OWASP/NVD matches, while tool-specific exclusion rules may not apply across scan modes. The result is false positives, missed importability, and undetected backdoored dependencies.

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Updated8/3/2026

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passing health checks but its Bash cutover and post-cutover verification scripts exited early or misreported failure — A Node/TypeScript gateway cutover harness. Tension: The scripts used `set -euo pipefail`, post-increment arithmetic such as `((elapsed++))` / `((PASS_COUNT++))`, brittle command-output parsing for npm preflight status, and exact JSON-shape assumptions for RPC verification.

vector-dedup and semantic-search integration tests. Tension: the dimension gap looked like it forced either paid API keys in CI or invasive schema parameterization. Outcome: every embedding-dependent test skipped or failed.

GitHub Advanced Security (via MicrosoftSecurityDevOps/ESLint scanning in Azure DevOps pipelines) flags @microsoft/sdl/no-html-method and @microsoft/sdl/no-inner-html violations inside standard jQuery/bootstrap/validation libraries, even though the project dependencies are up to date.

It still shows vulnerabilities. — when I pull the latest python:3.11-slim image. Tension: There are three vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-45490, CVE-2024-45491 and CVE-2024-45492).

We run `dotnet list .sln package --vulnerable --include-transitive --source https://api.nuget.org/v3/index.json` nightly on our CI server. Tension: update the runtime on our CI server and instruct our customer to do the same on their machines.

Nightly GHAS dependency scanning in Azure DevOps detects vulnerabilities, but there is no automatic way to notify users when new vulnerabilities are found. Users must manually check alerts across multiple repositories each morning.

querying the API too soon after the contract deployment can result in it matching an incorrect contract (!!) — using the Etherscan API to retrieve the verified source code of contracts. Outcome: This raises concerns about the reliability of using the Etherscan API for this purpose.

snyk is only checking files ending with the .json, .yml, .txt etc. — I added my github projects to snyk.io portal to check vulnerabilities. Tension: It's not checking vulnerabilities in typescript, js, java, python files. Outcome: Then it should be under "Code Analysis" (second item in your screenshot).

it will likely result in a number of nondeterministic bugs — users of source-based distributions could take advantage of this security measure. Tension: which will be impossible to locate automatically. Outcome: will greatly complicate a lot of things.

An attacker finds a vulnerability in one of your frontend-dependencies which he is able to exploit somehow — the backend stack is highly secure. Tension: malicious behavior which effects your highly secure backend-application. Outcome: keep your front end packages up-to-date.

ECR scan reports CVEs in the final Docker image

Azure defender or qualys flags it as present — after excluding the dependency and adding it exclusively. Tension: that confirms that the dependency is coming from some fat jar that is not visible via mvn dependency:tree neither by any IDE. Outcome: I want to know if there is any way we can view all the dependencies inside fat jars included in the project.

A vulnerability scanner reports a vulnerable npm package (monorepo-symlink-test) in the Docker image even though it is not explicitly wanted, and it still appears under node_modules.

Tension: it can contain false positives (very common with the OWASP tool) and "disputed" vulnerabilities. Outcome: Let's examine only t.

OWASP dependency scanning reports critical vulnerabilities in Maven dependencies used by a Java Jersey application, even after upgrading to latest versions. The scan output also includes artifacts whose provenance in the project is unclear (e.g., kerb-server).

The project’s dependency tree includes the vulnerable `inflight@1.0.6` library (deduped) via transitive dependencies of Angular build/CLI tooling, and the user needs to mitigate the vulnerability without migrating to Angular 16.

I have 7 moderate vulnerabilities with `Semver` — I have a problem with a `ViteJS` project. Tension: Depends on vulnerable versions of semver. Outcome: delete the `node_modules` and the `package-lock.json` but nothing to do it does not work.

The user wants an automated security vulnerability report for all Bower-managed dependencies similar to `npm audit`. They cannot find a Bower equivalent command/tool.

Snyk project scans do not consistently ignore/exclude folders depending on whether the project is imported via SCM versus run via the CLI, and behavior differs between Snyk Code (SAST) and Snyk Open Source scans.

Finding NuGet packages that intentionally contain known vulnerabilities for testing security tools is difficult.

I want to start measure the software security — I use sonar for detecting the vulnerabilities but it is not enough. Tension: I am not able to see the progress and effort spend on it. Outcome: what can I measure instead of number of vulnerabilities.

Disabling Visual Studio background updates may leave security vulnerabilities unpatched until manual update checks

Running `npm audit` reports 4 high severity vulnerabilities in the installed TestCafe dependencies. `npm audit fix --force` does not resolve them.

netty-all.4.1.58.Final, which give high security risk in nexus scan — Cassandra has been using netty-all.4.1.58.Final. Tension: sonatype-2021-0789, CVSS score 8.4.

Static scanners (e.g., flawfinder) flag the glibc implementations of strcpy/strcat as unsafe (CWE-120) — glibc implementations of strcpy/strcat. Tension: they use strlen/memcpy/strcpy logic without explicit destination-size checks. Outcome: they are not standalone vulnerabilities absent incorrect caller usage or separate length/metadata mishandling.

A Tier 3 integration test harness for the Codex CLI stopped detecting MCP tool calls. — after CLI flag, model, and JSON stream schema drift. Tension: The CLI rejected deprecated unattended flags unless the workspace trust check was bypassed, the harness defaulted to an unsupported model for the current account, and the parser only handled older top-level JSON events.

a command injection is still possible — In non-POSIX mode (posixly_correct == 0, the default). Tension: the incomplete CVE-2014-6271 (Shellshock) fix.

Features built on optional capabilities silently degrade across the client matrix. Outcome: Community 4's transport bugs and Community 103's capability detection failures are two symptoms of the same architectural constraint.

Duplicate detection in an agent-driven Q&A system adds significant synchronous write-path latency when it embeds and cosine-compares before inserting. Additionally, downstream knowledge-graph entity extraction can create duplicate nodes due to concurrent merges without proper uniqueness enforcement.

A CI source-grep gate blocking merges on forbidden DOM patterns. Outcome: all false positives.

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