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Graph/untrusted-redirect-and-redirect-loop

AntiPattern

Redirect Trust & Loops

untrusted-redirect-and-redirect-loop

Untrusted or misconfigured redirects let the app follow attacker-controlled URLs or bounce between routes, so payment state, auth, or scripts appear valid while the system actually loops, fails loads, or records unverifiable “success” without proof.

Node Details

Public graph metadata

Updated7/27/2026

Connections

30 linked nodes

MATCHESSolution

Initialize auth state to an indeterminate value (e.g., `undefined`) and render/loading or avoid redirect until `fetchCurrentUser` completes. After the async auth check, set `user` to either a valid user or null so the route guard redirects only when authentication is confirmed.

MATCHESSolution

Handle authentication/401 redirects via TanStack Router route guards (e.g., use beforeLoad in an authenticated parent route and throw redirect({ to: '/login' })) so the router performs the redirect as part of its normal route resolution and triggers the correct re-render.

MATCHESSolution

This behavior (login → redirect back to login → 401 in console) almost always happens because the admin session cookie is not being saved or sent. — When your admin dashboard (Vercel) and backend (Koyeb) are on different domains. Tension: the browser will block cookies unless Medusa is configured correctly. Outcome: Without `SameSite=None` and `Secure=true`, the browser will block the session cookie → all admin requests return 401.

MATCHESSolution

try separating your sign-in and sign-up pages — In addition to defining the path in env. Tension: This seems to have solved the redirects for me. Outcome: update the sign-in, sign-up paths in the dashboard.

MATCHESSolution

Clear the cookies and test it — on another browser. Tension: private routes all redirect to the home page. Outcome: it went trough just fine.

MATCHESSolution

Use react middleware to check for the cookie and redirect with react router, then call the validation route after the token is found

MATCHESSolution

I added the below redirect URL to the Web Platform in the Api App registration. Tension: AADSTS9002325: Proof Key for Code Exchange is required for cross-origin authorization code redemption. Outcome: http://localhost:8000/docs.

MATCHESSolution

You can use the `redirect` option to keep the customer on the page when confirming the checkout — when confirming the checkout. Tension: This only works for payments that can happen entirely on your page. Outcome: const result = await checkout.confirm({ redirect: 'if_required' });.

MATCHESSolution

I'm using Stripe in my NextJS 14 application. Tension: I don't want to run this code from the thank you page I'm currently redirecting from. Outcome: I'm expecting to run some code after successful payment and only then redirect to return_url.

MATCHESSolution

Implement tracking script to your website — Redirect users back to your website from Stripe. Tension: Set up webhook in Stripe that triggers on checkout.session.completed event. Outcome: Connect Google Ads API with your Tracklution account.

MATCHESSolution

Checkout Session is designed to redirect users only when a payment is successful. — with Checkout Session. Tension: when a payment fails, the users stays on the same page to allow them to retry the payment. Outcome: This way, when a payment fails, the users stays on the same page to allow them to retry the payment.

MATCHESSolution

fetch(url, { method: 'POST', redirect: 'follow'}) — frontend app is configured to follow the server-side redirect. Tension: not being automatically redirected. Outcome: fetch(url, { method: 'POST', redirect: 'follow'}).

MATCHESSolution

-browser back button = the customer should get redirected back to your endpoint — To loop back to your issue:. Tension: you could implement it to handle a second visit after Session creation differently.

MATCHESSolution

Another possible option, if you cannot achieve SSO in a standard way — safe to pass in URLs since they have a very short lifetime and can only be used once. Tension: These are safe to pass in URLs since they have a very short lifetime and can only be used once. Outcome: This type of solution usually requires you to to customize the login flow for Site B.

MATCHESSolution

Option 2 is often preferred within the same domain — making AJAX calls. Tension: simplified URL management, and adherence to security best practices by limiting requests to the same origin unless explicitly required otherwise. Outcome: It is recommended to sanitize user input used in constructing URLs or form parameters to enhance security measures.

MATCHESSolution

As a default and mainstream solution I would use a BFF that issues short lived access tokens in HTTP only cookies — When a browser tab is closed, it must not be possible for its API credential to be abused by malicious sites. Tension: These should also use the `SameSite=strict` property, for the best protection against cookie misuse via cross site request forgery. Outcome: These should also use the `SameSite=strict` property.

MATCHESSolution

HttpClient.GetAsync(new Uri(TextHelper.RedirectUrlNull(urlContent))); — We have an issue in our solution (we are using .net core). Tension: the SNYK vulnerabilities scaner show us that we have a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability.

MATCHESSolution

Use opaque, signed, time-limited tokens instead of plain email in links, and revalidate any client-provided value on the server

MATCHESSolution

PKCE protects against a specific vulnerability. — if something can intercept the redirect. Tension: the `code` alone is useless because they need the `code_verifier`. Outcome: they need the `code_verifier` which lives in the app that originally initiated the `authorization_code` flow.

MATCHESSolution

I resolved using this approach — For IoS - using TrustKit For Android - using OkHttp. Tension: react-native-ssl-pinning with axios in React Native. Outcome: Build and run your React Native app.

MATCHESSolution

Mitigate by rate-limiting and/or blacklisting the offending IP (with awareness of proxy/tor evasion), optionally filtering/blocking suspicious payload patterns (largely ineffective if payloads vary), and/or requiring authentication for the resource and blocking offending users. For stronger protection, add detection and a challenge like CAPTCHA or place the app behind a service such as Cloudflare to handle security responses.

MATCHESSolution

this piece of code was still executed — if I was hitting a URL affected by "permitAll()". Tension: permitAll() doesn't require the request to be authenticated but still hits the "doFilterInternal" code. Outcome: Found the problem.

MATCHESSolution

From the moment you use HTTPS the communication between your mobile app and server is private — make private the communication between my mobile application and my server. Tension: someone can intercepts http calls and copy the static token. Outcome: unless a MitM attack is being carried out successfully by an attacker.

MATCHESSolution

Use the documented `return_url` pattern where Stripe appends `payment_intent` and `payment_intent_client_secret` to the redirect URL; ensure the redirect page is served over TLS/HTTPS and do not log or expose the secret beyond the customer.

MATCHESSolution

implement something like Attestations Service — based on App/Device integrity or reputation verification.

MATCHESSolution

Resolve the conflict by handling redirection consistently in Cloudflare (and/or disabling the Apache redirect for the same purpose), then set Cloudflare SSL/TLS encryption to Full (Strict) so HTTPS upgrades and redirects complete without looping.

MATCHESSolution

case "CallbackRouteError": return { error: "Invalid credentials!" } — in my `login.ts` server action in the switch case clause. Tension: to return the correct errors. Outcome: bypass this error.

MATCHESSolution

redirect-uri: "https://localhost:41448/redirect-uri" — Here’s my application.yml configuration:.

MATCHESSolution

Wget before 1.21.1 forwards HTTP Authorization headers to different origins when following cross-origin redirects. — when following cross-origin redirects. Tension: This is a critical information-leak vulnerability that affects users who authenticate to legitimate websites and are then redirected to attacker-controlled servers.

MATCHESSolution

Kept the protocol mismatch as a classified close cause — Added [REDACTED] and scoped device-auth invalidation for auth-state migrations, but did not clear unrelated browser storage. Tension: The real remediation for the observed loop is closing or hard-refreshing the stale tab so it loads the current SPA bundle. Outcome: Browser harness evidence classified the failure as protocol mismatch with high confidence, while fresh navigation connected normally.

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