Graph/595490eb-7ddf-4d50-ada0-bc595989578e

Domainunvalidated

SQL Injection

595490eb-7ddf-4d50-ada0-bc595989578e

SQL Injection

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Updated5/1/2026

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psql reports a syntax error when using :myVar inside a PostgreSQL DO block

PERTAIN_TOSolution

With `psql`, you could use `\gexec` — The body of the `DO` statement is a dollar-quoted string literal. Outcome: the result of the `SELECT` statement (the `DO` statement) will be executed.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

But no error is found... — I'm trying to use Psalm to detect SQL Injections. Tension: I have no config file. Outcome: I edited the config file `psalm.xml`.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

I edited the config file `psalm.xml` — I enabled the `pdo` extension. Outcome: And now I just run the commande like so.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

The pandas DataFrame.query() method is susceptible to code injection, allowing arbitrary code execution when unsafe user input is processed.

PERTAIN_TORootCause

The `subprocess.run` command, as opposed to `os.system`, doesn't allow for arbitrary shell execution. Tension: like redirections or multiple commands in one string. Outcome: by default. You'd have to explicitely set `shell=True` for that.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

I get the variables, for example `text`, directly from the user. Tension: could allow the user to execute malicious code. Outcome: I have rewritten the code to this:.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Tension: The `subprocess.run` command, as opposed to `os.system`, doesn't allow for arbitrary shell execution. Outcome: process = subprocess.run(cmd + args, check=True).

PERTAIN_TOProblem

result = duckdb.query("SELECT * FROM df_data WHERE id={}".format(user_input)) — duckdb to perform some queries on dataframes. Tension: user-input that I need to add to the query. Outcome: It seems it's possible.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

duckdb.execute("""SELECT * FROM df_data WHERE id=?""", (user_input,)).df() — queries on dataframes. Tension: duckdb has no PreparedStatement for queries on dataframes. Outcome: duckdb.execute("""SELECT * FROM df_data WHERE id=?""", (user_input,)).df().

PERTAIN_TOProblem

unable to read file 'C:\\Users\\"myname\\sqlmap-dev\\plugins\\dbms\\mssqlserver\\filesystem.py'.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Then copy the file to the sqlmap\plugins\dbms\mssqlserver directory — to fix it just go to the following folder sqlmap\plugins\generic. Tension: unable to read file 'C:\\Users\\"myname\\sqlmap-dev\\plugins\\dbms\\mssqlserver\\filesystem.py'. Outcome: there is a filesystem.py file.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

Command injection payload with a semicolon does not execute a second command via Runtime.exec()

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Use a shell wrapper only if shell metacharacters are intended, otherwise pass arguments as a command array and avoid shell parsing

PERTAIN_TOProblem

Your current approach exposes your application to serious SQL injections. — You're currently inserting the `username` directly from the `session` into the `SQL` query.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

using `exit` within the loop is unnecessary. — since you've set `... LIMIT 1` in your `SQL` query. Tension: you expect at most one result. Outcome: an `if` check is more appropriate than a `while` loop.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Solution: Always use `prepared` statements to mitigate this risk. — `$stmt = $db->prepare("SELECT image_file01 FROM test WHERE User=? LIMIT 1");. Tension: You're currently inserting the `username` directly from the `session` into the `SQL` query. Outcome: $stmt->bind_param("s", $user);.

PERTAIN_TORootCause

UPDATE tblProduct SET #form.F# = 01 WHERE ID = #form.ID# — The original developer has long since left the company. Tension: the problem is `form.F` and `form.ID`. Outcome: for `form.ID` you should use ``, this will prevent any sql injection attempts.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

The automated review says there is an issue on the 3rd and 4th lines. — UPDATE tblProduct SET #form.F# = 01 WHERE ID = #form.ID#. Tension: I guess the problem is `form.F` and `form.ID`. Outcome: Dynamic SQL table column names from the form is not the best approach.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Dynamic SQL table column names from the form is not the best approach. — for `form.ID` you should use ``, this will prevent any sql injection attempts. Tension: But if you must, then I would create a map structure which controls the values which are finally rendered in the original query. Outcome: Still, I recommend using proper column names instead of a dynamic variable.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

Whether using Sequelize.Op.eq is enough to prevent SQL injection when saving user input to the database

PERTAIN_TOSolution

use `Seqlelize.Op.eq` to prevent SQL injection — I'm using nodejs, express and sequlize to display a form and save it to a databse. Tension: or should some other technique (such as normalize) also be used? Outcome: Also is there something else I need to watch out for?

PERTAIN_TOProblem

if any parameter values also contain single quotes — requests that use single quotes. Tension: those must be double escaped. Outcome: you can replace single quotes by double single quotes until the bug is fixed.

PERTAIN_TOReport

CVE-2014-6271 Shellshock — bash function import via env var executes trailing commands

PERTAIN_TOReport

CVE-2014-7169: Shellshock secondary command-injection via invalid function identifiers

PERTAIN_TOReport

GNU patch CVE-2019-13638 - Shell injection via unquoted filenames in ed script

PERTAIN_TOReport

CVE-2019-13638: GNU patch shell injection via popen() in do_ed_script

PERTAIN_TOReport

CVE-2019-13638: GNU patch shell injection via unquoted temp filename in do_ed_script()

PERTAIN_TORootCause

the legal_identifier check is skipped due to short-circuit evaluation in a conditional — when posixly_correct is 0 (the default). Tension: allowing function names to contain shell metacharacters like backticks or command substitution syntax. Outcome: parse_and_execute(temp_string, ...) processes the constructed string containing unvalidated tname.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

when posixly_correct is 0 (the default). Tension: the validation of function names extracted from environment variable names is insufficient.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

The fix requires two changes — line 394. Tension: The legal_identifier check must happen before tname is used in the memcpy operations.

PERTAIN_TORootCause

src/pch.c:do_ed_script() builds a shell command with sprintf("%s %s%s", editor_program, "- ", outname) at line 2399 then feeds it to popen() at line 2403 — GNU patch (<= 2.7.6) src/pch.c:do_ed_script(). Outcome: popen() spawns /bin/sh -c.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

shell metacharacters in outname (`;`, backticks, $(), `|`) execute arbitrary commands — when an attacker-controlled patch file is processed. Outcome: CVE-2018-1000156's get_ed_command_letter() filter only constrained which ed commands were forwarded; it did NOT sanitize the filename interpolated into popen.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

The parser executes ALL commands in the string — including anything after the closing brace of the function body. — When Bash initializes, it imports shell functions from environment variables. Outcome: This allows arbitrary command execution.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

The durable fix moved function imports under a distinct env-var prefix `BASH_FUNC_name%%` — Upstream remediation evolved across multiple patches. Tension: ad-hoc string checks proved insufficient. Outcome: the function importer is a separate, dedicated parser and the general env loop never feeds attacker text to parse_and_execute.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Shell-quote outname in do_ed_script before the sprintf — do_ed_script() at pch.c:2399-2403. Tension: avoid shell interpretation entirely.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

replace the direct concatenation with a properly quoted version — The patch codebase already has a quotearg() function available for this purpose. Tension: avoid shell interpretation entirely by using execvp() with a pre-constructed argv array instead of popen() with a shell command string.

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