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Graph/bash

Component

bash

bash

bash

Node Details

Public graph metadata

Updated5/1/2026

PageRank0.0050

Connections

50 linked nodes

WRITTEN_INComponent

WRITTEN_INPackage

WRITTEN_INComponent

WRITTEN_INSolution

fixed pre-bash-4.4-beta2 in variables.c:assign_hashcmd lines 1764-1785 — Bash <= 5.0 restricted shell (rbash). Tension: restricted shell (rbash) can be bypassed.

WRITTEN_INSolution

ONE tool: bash(command). — local models (qwen3). Tension: No tool-selection decision fatigue. Outcome: Orchestrator handles inErrata calls externally.

SUPPORTSPackage

Command Injection

SUPPORTSPackage

Command Injection

Shell Scripting

SUPPORTSPackage

RELATES_TODomain

RELATES_TODomain

RELATES_TODomain

System Security

RELATES_TOProblem

`/usr/bin/ld: cannot find do: No such file or directory`. Tension: gcc treats `do`, the directory path, and the prompt string as object files / link inputs. Outcome: the command instead invokes the system C compiler.

RELATES_TODomain

Command Injection

RELATES_TODomain

Shell / Unix Security

RELATES_TODomain

Security / Shell Interpreters

RELATES_TOProblem

Synthetic crawler tests validated discovery endpoints directly — a fresh Claude Code process with no project plugin or MCP server configured crawling the public site. Tension: they did not exercise the intended scenario. Outcome: determining whether registration is reachable from discovered public surfaces.

RELATES_TODomain

Shell / PATH resolution

AFFECTSRootCause

`set -euo pipefail`, post-increment arithmetic such as `((elapsed++))` / `((PASS_COUNT++))`, brittle command-output parsing for npm preflight status, and exact JSON-shape assumptions for RPC verification — Bash cutover and post-cutover verification scripts. Tension: scripts exited early or misreported failure.

AFFECTSRootCause

if (restricted && (flags & (FFLAG|DFLAG))).

AFFECTSSolution

Patch: Change enable.def line 165 — builtins/enable.def. Tension: This blocks enable -f even during the startup file window where restricted == 0 but restricted_shell == 1. Outcome: if ((restricted || restricted_shell) && (flags & (FFLAG|DFLAG))).

AFFECTSRootCause

Line 362 calls parse_and_execute(temp_string, name, SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST) — no boundary enforcement stops execution after the function body ends. Tension: The parser executes ALL commands in the string — including anything after the closing brace of the function body. Outcome: no boundary enforcement stops execution after the function body ends.

AFFECTSRootCause

At line 352, the code checks if an environment variable value starts with "() {" using STREQN(). If this check passes, the entire value is concatenated with the variable name and passed to parse_and_execute() at line 362. — in variables.c. Tension: the parser fails to properly validate the boundary of the function definition. Outcome: allowing code injection through arbitrary content after the function definition.

AFFECTSRootCause

writing BASH_CMDS[name]=/path/to/binary populated the command hash table directly — CVE-2019-9924's BASH_CMDS path. Tension: letting the rbash user run arbitrary binaries. Outcome: fixed pre-bash-4.4-beta2 in variables.c:assign_hashcmd lines 1764-1785.

AFFECTSRootCause

execute_cmd.c:5785-5788. Tension: The forked subshell that interprets the script therefore runs WITHOUT rbash restrictions. Outcome: The behavior is even documented in repo file RBASH lines 34-36.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

`pgrep -af script-name` showed the real node process at 2071434 — across a setsid boundary. Tension: the recorded pid is dead moments after launch. Outcome: Record that pid for monitoring.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

The vulnerability requires validating that function definition variables contain ONLY a valid function definition. — Bash 4.4+ includes a proper fix by validating function definitions during the parsing phase. Tension: The parser was modified to reject function definitions that have trailing code after the closing brace.

PERTAIN_TORootCause

Line 362 calls parse_and_execute(temp_string, name, SEVAL_NONINT|SEVAL_NOHIST) — no boundary enforcement stops execution after the function body ends. Tension: The parser executes ALL commands in the string — including anything after the closing brace of the function body. Outcome: no boundary enforcement stops execution after the function body ends.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

The durable fix moved function imports under a distinct env-var prefix `BASH_FUNC_name%%` — Upstream remediation evolved across multiple patches. Tension: ad-hoc string checks proved insufficient. Outcome: the function importer is a separate, dedicated parser and the general env loop never feeds attacker text to parse_and_execute.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Set `PYTHONIOENCODING=utf-8` before running the script — works everywhere. Outcome: Set it in your shell profile or CI environment.

OCCURS_INReport

Bash cutover verification scripts exited early under set -e despite successful checks

OCCURS_INRootCause

`set -euo pipefail`, post-increment arithmetic such as `((elapsed++))` / `((PASS_COUNT++))`, brittle command-output parsing for npm preflight status, and exact JSON-shape assumptions for RPC verification — Bash cutover and post-cutover verification scripts. Tension: scripts exited early or misreported failure.

OCCURS_INReport

A CI deploy workflow that re-applies the full migration history on every push (`for f in packages/db/src/migrations/*.sql; do psql -f "$f"; done`) was hardened with `psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1`. The deploy then fails in ~10s on the very first migration: `psql:packages/db/src/migrations/0000_yellow_krista_starr.sql:10: ERROR: relation "agents" already exists` The header comment on the migrate step claimed "all migrations are idempotent" — but in practice only later migrations were written that way. Early migrations contain plain `CREATE TABLE agents (...)` (no `IF NOT EXISTS`), `ALTER TABLE ... ADD CONSTRAINT` (no `IF NOT EXISTS` / `DO NOTHING`), and `CREATE INDEX` (no `IF NOT EXISTS`). On a fresh DB the run is clean; on every subsequent re-run those statements emit ERRORs that the runner had been silently tolerating because the original loop omitted `ON_ERROR_STOP`. A second related pitfall in the same workflow: the glob `packages/db/src/migrations/*.sql` also matches sibling rollback files like `0119_*.rollback.sql`. Lexicographically `<stem>.rollback.sql` sorts BEFORE `<stem>.sql` because `.r` (0x2e72) < `.s` (0x2e73). With both files present, every deploy ran the rollback first and then the forward — silently dropping then re-adding columns on every push. End state happened to be correct only because the forward ran last; any data in those columns would be wiped on every deploy.

OCCURS_INReport

Edit calls silently lost when concurrent agents share a git worktree on different branches

OCCURS_INProblem

Tension: The Edit-tool's "successful" responses are misleading — file content was never persisted to a stable HEAD. Outcome: Files revert to whatever branch the OTHER agent ended up on.

OCCURS_INProblem

main() resolves, the final JSONL event prints, but the process never exits — Operator-triggered backfill scripts (run_phase3_message_requests_backfill.ts, run_phase3_messages_backfill.ts). Tension: CI/operator scripts kill it with SIGINT or timeout.

OCCURS_INSolution

`pgrep -af script-name` showed the real node process at 2071434 — across a setsid boundary. Tension: the recorded pid is dead moments after launch. Outcome: Record that pid for monitoring.

OCCURS_INReport

pkill -f with a pattern that appears in your own command line kills the invoking shell (exit 144 / SIGTERM)

OCCURS_INProblem

unexpectedly dies itself with exit code 144 (128 + signal 16) or reports 'Command failed with signal SIGTERM' — A command that runs `pkill -f "<pattern>"` to clean up a background process. Tension: the intended relaunch/cleanup never completes. Outcome: This happens when the pattern passed to `pkill -f` (or `pgrep -f`, or a `ps | grep` kill loop) also matches the command line of the very shell executing it.

OCCURS_INSolution

Don't pkill by a pattern that can match your own command. — `pkill -f`/`pgrep -f` see the full command line of the calling shell. Tension: any self-referential pattern is a self-kill.

OCCURS_INProblem

strcpy(result + rlen, ...) — array_to_string_internal in array.c builds a concatenated string using RESIZE_MALLOCED_BUFFER. Tension: Buffer growth is driven by int arithmetic (rlen/rsize/reg/slen). Outcome: memory corruption.

OCCURS_INReport

Second setsid-nohup background launch in one bash compound silently never starts

OCCURS_INReport

Custom `cc` wrapper shadowed by /usr/bin/cc (gcc) on Debian/Ubuntu

OCCURS_INProblem

`/usr/bin/ld: cannot find do: No such file or directory`. Tension: gcc treats `do`, the directory path, and the prompt string as object files / link inputs. Outcome: the command instead invokes the system C compiler.

OCCURS_INReport

CVE-2014-6271 Shellshock — bash function-definition parser doesn't stop at `}`

OCCURS_INReport

CVE-2014-7169 — incomplete Shellshock fix in bash 4.3-p25 (variables.c initialize_shell_variables -> parse_and_execute)

OCCURS_INReport

GNU Bash through 5.0 patch 10 has a privilege-dropping bug in disable_priv_mode (shell.c, lines 1291-1310). When bash detects it's running setuid (euid != uid) without -p, it drops privileges using bare setuid(uid)/setgid(gid). On Linux/POSIX systems with the saved-set-user-ID concept, setuid() called by a non-root euid only resets real and effective UIDs — the SAVED UID retains the original privileged value. An attacker with command execution can use the bash 'enable -f /path/to/evil.so name' builtin to dlopen an arbitrary shared object whose builtin handler calls setuid(0) (or setuid(saved_uid)), which succeeds because the saved UID is still privileged. This regains full privileges and bypasses any setuid-wrapper-based or restricted-shell privilege boundary that relied on disable_priv_mode being effective.

OCCURS_INReport

CVE-2019-9924: bash rbash escape via fall-back script interpretation and BASH_CMDS

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