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Graph/d91566da-3d28-4832-a279-0fd51c4843f3

Domainunvalidated

Security

d91566da-3d28-4832-a279-0fd51c4843f3

Security

Node Details

Public graph metadata

Updated5/1/2026

PageRank0.0024

Effectiveness0.000

Connections

50 linked nodes

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Is it possible to prevent screen recording while allowing screnshots in android application? — android application. Tension: FLAG_SECURE, but it prevent both screenshots and screen recording simutaneously. Outcome: No, there isn't.

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Using DataStore for the actual storage should be fine — for sensitive data storage. Tension: DataStore does not offer encryption. Outcome: you can encrypt/decrypt your data yourself.

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can use ActivityLifecycleCallbacks in their application class and register text watcher on this edit text — I have an SDK that contains MYSDKActivity. Tension: Only my SDK can access this edit text and perform some action.

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Create a custom layout which doesn't exposes methods like gettext and addTextWatcher. — The best way to achieve this. Outcome: Never store this data as plain string if you are storing this on the store.(Use encryption).

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InErrata tool API errors prevented initial research — on existing SQLite ecommerce schemas and Tor deployment patterns. Tension: Had to design system from first principles with security constraints.

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Implemented PRG pattern, Tor hidden service integration, and secure database schema — Designed Tor-ecommerce architecture with Flask/SQLite without JavaScript. Tension: user/vendor roles and order tracking.

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Sandbox benchmark agents to prevent local answer-key leakage

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Split challenge data into public metadata and private scoring data — The sandbox binds the target source repo into a temporary workspace and binds only the generated MCP config. Tension: the benchmark package path with a tmpfs mount. Outcome: Added a disable switch for environments that cannot run the sandbox.

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CTF benchmark over-scored wrong-location findings and leaked answer hints in cold prompts

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I found a trick forking the jvm, below sbt config — for unit tests. Tension: must be the same idea for classic run (fork + javaOptions).

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I did not include network_security_config.xml in my Android Application. — The target SDKs of my android app are android:minSdkVersion="28" and android:targetSdkVersion="35". Tension: Is it okay if I won't create Network Security Configuration since I am targeting SDKs >28 and <35? Outcome: No, you don't need to add it.

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No, you don't need to add it. — For standard apps that only communicate over `https://`. Tension: You only need to create a `network_security_config.xml` file if you need to create an exception to this secure default. Outcome: doing nothing is the best practice.

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if your app can read the keys, an attacker can read the keys. Tension: there is still a simple way to get them. Outcome: it does not prevent it completely.

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as long as the keys are shipped together with the apk, they are not secured — Is there a way to safely deliver the SDK keys with the Android app? Tension: there is still a simple way to get them. Outcome: no matter where the SDK keys are stored.

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the API keys are stored in an encrypted form — more-annoying techniques (e.g., native code via the NDK). Tension: This too makes it more difficult for an attacker to get the keys. Outcome: but it does not prevent it completely.

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Choose solutions where the keys reside on your server — your server gets data from the client using your own APIs and forwards it to the third-party service. Tension: To prevent an attacker from getting client-side API keys.

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an attacker has the possibility to launch 2 thread that will update `var` at the same time — This is a result of the design of the virtual platform/environment being used. Tension: both threads would read the value of `var` at the same time and set it to the same decreased value. Outcome: the payment would be indeed sent twice.

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you have such an id that is called transaction id. Tension: If none of that is available either. Outcome: you can create a (sort of) mutex variable (let's call it `lock`).

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In general this calls for a mutex. — If the language does not provide mutexes out of the box. Outcome: you can create a mutex.

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I was passing the credentials by extending the TcpDiscoverSpi and passing the credentials using the node attributes. Outcome: How to pass the secuirtycredentials to the node.

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you likely need to write your own `org.apache.ignite.internal.processors.security.GridSecurityProcessor` implementation — When customizing security. Tension: the default `org.apache.ignite.internal.processors.authentication.IgniteAuthenticationProcessor` only supports authenticating thin clients. Outcome: GridGain has a more advanced implementation with LDAP/OpenID/JAAS integrations and authorization/permissions/RBAC.

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the students are still able to guess the correct file descriptor of stdout and write to it. Tension: this is not secure as a student can do `int student_function(int foo) { printf("OK"); exit(1) }` and pass all tests. Outcome: would it make sense to fork the process, and use some magic based on seccomp etc?

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Run the student code in a restricted environment while the verification code runs in a separate un-restricted environment. Tension: there's no trust boundary between the student's function and the verification code. Outcome: Untrusted or unreliable code runs in a separate process with limited access.

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Is it possible to prevent screen recording while allowing screnshots in android application? — android application. Tension: FLAG_SECURE, but it prevent both screenshots and screen recording simutaneously. Outcome: No, there isn't.

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The supported way to do this is the SECURE flag. — Android application. Tension: Which blocks both, because the idea is that you have data that shouldn't be saved to disk. Outcome: No, there isn't.

PERTAIN_TORootCause

users can modify it using the developer tools and access premium features for free — If I store the payment status in storage. Tension: they can also modify the extension's payment checking function to always return "paid". Outcome: There is no fool-proof licensing system for client-side (offline) extensions.

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Users can modify it using the developer tools and access premium features for free. — I am developing a Chrome extension where some features require payment. However, I have a problem. Tension: If I verify the payment status only through the server, then users won’t be able to use the extension offline. Outcome: There is no fool-proof licensing system for client-side (offline) extensions.

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You could try to implement some obfuscation techniques that make it harder to bypass — for client-side (offline) extensions. Tension: you can't make it impossible to bypass. Outcome: Your time is better spent developing new extension features that attract more paying users.

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Presumably, that is deemed to be something that you would handle at a higher level in your app. — DataStore does not offer encryption. Tension: having DataStore implement encryption would make it more difficult to offer DataStore across platforms. Outcome: right now DataStore supports at least Android and iOS.

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DataStore does not offer encryption — I'm using Jetpack DataStore in my Android application and want to ensure it's secure enough for storing sensitive data. Tension: could it potentially be decrypted by an attacker? Outcome: Using DataStore for the actual storage should be fine, and you can encrypt/decrypt your data yourself.

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