Graph/bfbfd217-73bd-49d7-ab9f-dae95787ad44

Domainunvalidated

Sandboxing

bfbfd217-73bd-49d7-ab9f-dae95787ad44

Sandboxing

Node Details

Public graph metadata

Updated5/1/2026

PageRank0.0009

Effectiveness0.000

Connections

45 linked nodes

IMPLEMENTATION_OFComponent

docker

IMPLEMENTATION_OFComponent

s&box

PERTAIN_TOReport

Sandbox benchmark agents to prevent local answer-key leakage

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Split challenge data into public metadata and private scoring data — The sandbox binds the target source repo into a temporary workspace and binds only the generated MCP config. Tension: the benchmark package path with a tmpfs mount. Outcome: Added a disable switch for environments that cannot run the sandbox.

PERTAIN_TORootCause

The problem was that the workflow declared the safe directory outside of the docker containter. — Run ad-m/github-push-action@v0.5.0. Tension: fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at '/github/workspace/docs/build/html'. Outcome: This can apparently be fixed by instead using.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

How to get full Traceback messages when the 'open' syscall is banned? Tension: I use the python bindings of `libseccomp` library to avoid triggering unsafe system calls. Outcome: You will have to grant write access to `stdout` and `stderr`.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

You can use the `traceback` library for this. — place the user's code in try and catch and print any exceptions. Tension: The output would be similar to:. Outcome: You can add write permissions to `stdout` and `stderr` in your code like this:.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Use a real sandboxing mechanism (e.g., iframe sandboxing or other isolation) instead of relying on web components; optionally provide a reusable sandbox wrapper or enforce an API/store policy and accept risk via contracts/licensing when using user-provided components.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

I need a way to sandbox the code and limit its permissions. — dynamically loading and executing third-party code. Outcome: there are (currently) no alternatives for running untrusted Java code within a Java application.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Untrusted Javascript can be run safely in a typical web browser. — An alternative would be to require the untrusted code you want to run to be written in Javascript. Tension: neither web browsers or GraalVM are immune from security flaws. Outcome: A GraalVM application can run Javascript in a security sandbox.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

Is possible to call cl:open by another way? — I need to hide dungerous function(s), for example, cl:open for thirdparty code downloaded from internet. Outcome: There will be more.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Work out what a safe subset of the language is — Design a package which reexports only the names from CL which are in this safe subset. Tension: there are snares everywhere. Outcome: Design a safe reader. This should at least prevent read-time evaluation.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

" would like to access data from other apps" — On Sonoma (macOS 14) i keep getting the dialog. Tension: It does NOT try to access anothers app AppContainer. Outcome: I am quite lost, just seeing that others got this issue too.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

remove the App Groups capability — In Xcode → Signing & Capabilities. Outcome: Once I reselected the correct group, the entitlement synced properly and the alert stopped appearing.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

The onliest workaround I found so far is to create a subfolder in documents folder — requires users acceptance. Tension: Then InDesign asks (once only) to access that folder. Outcome: and store the images there.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Set the App Group to $(TeamIdentifierPrefix)myFirm.myName in Xcode and use the real group ID in code

PERTAIN_TOProblem

the creds.json file isn't included, leading to failures in authentication — When building a Docker image, the creds.json file isn't included, leading to failures in authentication. Tension: Given these challenges, I am seeking advice on the best practices for securely managing and accessing the `creds.json` file in both Docker and Google Cloud Run environments. Outcome: How to Securely Manage creds.json for Google Cloud Run Deployment.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

ECR scan reports CVEs in the final Docker image

PERTAIN_TOSolution

new Function(userCode); — verify (client-side) that the user has entered valid JavaScript code. Tension: Pulling in a Javascript parser (e.g. Acorn or Esprima) is a relatively heavy dependency. Outcome: Parsing/compiling JS code is safe and has no side effects.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

you could write something like `new Function("}, alert(1), function () {")` and have it execute arbitrary code — under V8. Tension: JavaScriptCore could outright crash when fed invalid code to the constructor. Outcome: this actually used to be quite unsafe.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

Chrome fails to start in Docker because the sandbox cannot create required namespaces

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Set the seccomp profile's defaultAction to SCMP_ACT_LOG, reproduce the failure, and inspect system logs to identify the missing syscall

PERTAIN_TOSolution

Use the logged syscall name to add the correct allow rule to chrome.json

PERTAIN_TOProblem

`load` is still available. — if I set `os` and `io` to `nil` before running the script. Tension: This will allow loading malicious bytecode. Outcome: Likewise, the `debug` library is still available as an attack vector too.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

`io.input`, `io.read`, `io.lines` and `io.write` will not be available — With your current `io.input`, `io.read`, `io.lines` and `io.write`. Tension: for reading from stdin or writing to stdout. Outcome: however `print` will still be available.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

Harmless time & date functions like `os.clock`, `os.date`, `os.difftime`. Tension: will also be inaccessible.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

`load` is still available. — if I set `os` and `io` to `nil` before running the script. Tension: will it completely prevent user from gaining access to those standard libraries? Outcome: This will allow loading malicious bytecode.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

Even if you think 'Than i set `package` to `nil`' — In Lua. Tension: will work. Outcome: require("os").execute('echo "Oups - Didnt mentioned that"').

PERTAIN_TOSolution

In Lua all unwanted References (especially in `package.loaded`) should be set to `nil` — If you only set a "pointer" to nil this will still be possible... Outcome: then it is ready for: `collectgarbage()`.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

I reviewed each one individually, reading the CVE, to assess whether it was necessary to fix them. — they found 13 critical vulnerabilities (!!). Outcome: assess whether it was necessary to fix them.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

if this indicate some security issue ?

PERTAIN_TOSolution

If you are concerned about pods executing things in Kubernetes or in the host.

PERTAIN_TOReport

Bubblewrap sandbox made Ollama CLI fail with read-only ~/.ollama temp files

PERTAIN_TOProblem

Error: failed to save: create temp failed: open ~/.ollama/.tmp-*: read-only file system — A benchmark orchestrator ran local Ollama-backed agents inside a Bubblewrap sandbox. Tension: The sandbox used a read-only bind of the host root and intentionally did not bind the full home directory. Outcome: The Ollama CLI failed immediately.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

AxiosError: There is no suitable adapter to dispatch the request since :. Tension: adapter xhr is not supported by the environment adapter http is not available in the build adapter fetch is not supported by the environment. Outcome: Error fetching posts.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

I’m trying to use GraalVM to execute JavaScript code that makes a REST call using Java. — execute JavaScript code that makes a REST call.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

GraalVM JavaScript is not installed, so Context.newBuilder("js") and ScriptEngineManager.getEngineByName("JavaScript") fail

PERTAIN_TOReport

s&box: .NET API whitelist — blocked APIs and their s&box equivalents (System.IO, HttpClient, Reflection)

PERTAIN_TOProblem

developers get confusing compile errors when trying to use System.IO, System.Reflection, System.Threading.Thread, System.Net, System.Diagnostics.Process, and other restricted APIs — In s&box, the .NET API is sandboxed. Tension: many standard .NET types and namespaces are blocked for security. Outcome: The whitelist is enforced at compile time.

PERTAIN_TOSolution

BLOCKED → USE INSTEAD — s&box enforces an API whitelist. Tension: many standard .NET types and namespaces are blocked for security. Outcome: use the s&box equivalents instead of blocked .NET APIs.

PERTAIN_TOProblem

Synthetic crawler tests validated discovery endpoints directly — a fresh Claude Code process with no project plugin or MCP server configured crawling the public site. Tension: they did not exercise the intended scenario. Outcome: determining whether registration is reachable from discovered public surfaces.

PERTAIN_TORootCause

A plain `ollama run` model process would not have shell/MCP/tool access — existing Claude Code benchmark. Tension: it would not behave like the other audit agents.

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